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Handbooks and local jurisdiction in
Ming China. According to the sections
on judicial matters in the «Shih-cheng
lu» by Lü K’un, a handbook for
magistrates
Dominiek Delporte
1 In imperial China, judicial matters fell under the authority of administrators at all levels of the
civil and military administration. For most of these officials, their judicial function was only one of
the  many functions  they had to  exercise;  they also  were  responsible  for  matters  such as  tax
collection, public works, ceremonial observances, or the supervision of granaries. Few of them had
enjoyed  specialized  judicial  training,  but  they  were  nevertheless  expected  to  have  enough
knowledge of the law and of judicial procedures to be able to perform their judicial duties2.
2 In order to improve the judicial knowledge and skills of these officials, and in order to
help  them  to  avoid  malpractices,  commentaries  on  the  codes –  originally  only  by
government  functionaries  in  their  official  capacity,  but  from  the  Yüan  dynasty
(1279-1368)  on  also  by  private  individuals –  and  handbooks  for  magistrates  were
compiled. This form of literature was aimed at explaining the meaning of the statutes and
at advising the officials on their application. Some of the handbooks are reprints of the
code with interlinear commentary between the statutes and sub-statutes, others are case
collections in which the decision in each case is motivated with stipulations from the
code, precedents, or moral concepts. A third group of handbooks is formed by manuals
that  give practical  advice  for  each procedure the civil  officials  were responsible  for.
Handbooks belonging to this last group also contain some excerpts from the code, and
illustrate important steps in the procedures by means of specific cases.
3 In comparison with the administrative regulations and the official histories, the handbooks for
magistrates give a much more realistic insight into judicial practice and into civil administration
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in general. The former shows us how the judicial system was ideally supposed to work, whereas the
latter point out how it functioned in reality. Other interesting sources that enable us to see some of
the problems and shortcomings of the judicial administration are memorials, directed to the throne
by  officials  whose  anger  was  frequently  triggered  by  malpractice  on  different  levels  of  the
administrational hierarchy3.
 
1. The most influential handbooks
4 Some handbooks for magistrates written under the Southern Sung (1127-1279) and Ming
(1368-1644)  dynasties  remained  influential  until  the  end  of  the  Ch’ing  dynasty
(1644-1912). In 1211, the «T’ang-yin pi-shih» («Parallel cases from under the pear-tree»)4, a
collection of law cases serving as a manual for judicial officials, was published by Kuei
Wan-jung. This work is a collection of reports on 144 cases, judged between 300 B.C. and
A.D. 1100. It is more anecdotal than technical however, and it even contains legendary
sections.5
5 A more realistic work, and also one of the most famous and influential handbooks in
Chinese legal history, is a book on forensics written during the Southern Sung, entitled «
Hsi yüan lu» («Essay on the washing away of wrongs»)6, by Sung Tz’u (1186-1249), who
served in several local administrative and judicial posts. He wrote the handbook using his
own experience and material from earlier handbooks. The «Hsi yüan lu» was completed
around 1247.
6 The work of Sung Tz’u was imitated by others, in works bearing titles such as «P’ing yüan
lu» («Essay on the redressing of wrongs», by Chao I-chai)and «Wu yüan lu» («Essay on the
avoiding of grievances», compiled in the Yüan (1279-1368) by Wang Yü). Several similar
works  from the  Ch’ing  dynasty  (1644-1912)  are  entitled  «Hsi  yüan  chi-lu» («Collected
writings on the washing away of wrongs»). In these works, new elements were added to
the material given in Sung Tz’u’s book7.
7 More  comprehensive  handbooks  from  the  Yüan  are  the  «Kuan-min  chung-yung»
(«Standard references for officials and civilians») and the «Shih-min yao-lan» (Essential
references for officials and civilians»)8.
8 An important example of a Ming manual is the «Lin min pao-ching» («Precious mirror for
governing the people»), by Su Mao-hsiang, published in 1632. It is a reprint of the code
with commentary added between each article. Yüan and Ming texts on forensics (the «
P’ing yüan lu» and the «Wu yüan lu») were appended to this work9.
9 Many handbooks originated in the author’s personal experience as a civil administrator.
Lü K’un (1536-1618, alternative name Lü Hsin-wu)10,  the author of the «Shih-cheng lu»
(«Record of practical government»), passed the three degrees of examinations for civil
office11 between  1561  and  1574,  and  then  started  an  impressive  career  in  the  civil
administration. During this career, he was renowned for his discipline and integrity12.
After having held two positions as a local magistrate, between 1574 and 1578, he became a
secretary in the ministry of personnel13 in 1578. Also in this function, he stressed the
importance of law and order, and rose to the position of bureau director. In 1587, he
started his  provincial  career,  becoming an administration vice commissioner14 of  the
province of Shan-tung; in 1589, he was appointed as a surveillance commissioner15 for the
province of Shan-hsi; in 1591 and 1592, he served as an administration commissioner16 for
the province of Shen-hsi, and between 1592 and 1594, he was the governor of Shan-hsi17.
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During the time he held these provincial posts, he issued collections of written advice to
his  subordinates  and  colleagues,  as  introductions  to  the  civil  and  judicial  local
administration18. He issued five different documents comprised of prescriptions: «Ming-
chih» (prescriptions for provincial officials),  «Hsiang-chia yüeh» (prescriptions for local
sub-official personnel), «Feng-hsien yüeh» (advice for provincial surveillance officials and
censors19), «Yü-cheng» (prescriptions for officials in charge of prisons), and «Tu-fu yüeh»
(advice for governors and governors-general). In 1598, these were printed together under
the  title  «Lü-kung  shih-cheng  lu» («Record of  practical  government  by  Lord Lü»).  His
handbook  was  later  abridged  and  adapted,  and  remained  an  important  manual  for
provincial magistrates during the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1912), under the title «Shih-cheng
lu» («Record of practical government»)20.
10 New handbooks also appeared during the Ch’ing. The most influential ones were the «Mu-
ling shu» («Compendium on magisterial service», compiled in 1848 by Hsü Tung), the «Fu-
hui  ch’üan-shu»  («Complete  book  on  well-being  and  benevolence»,  edited  in  1694  by
Huang Liu-hung) and the «Hsüeh-chih i-shuo» («Views on learning governance», published
by Wang Hui-tsu (1731-1807) in 1793). The «Mu-ling shu» was extremely important, since
it was the most comprehensive handbook, bringing together selections from influential
authors throughout the Ch’ing dynasty21.
2. The importance of Lü K’un’s manual
11 Handbooks like the «Hsi yüan lu», the «Shih-cheng lu» and the Ch’ing handbooks give us an
abundance of practical instructions for judicial procedures. Whereas the «Hsi yüan lu» and
its descendants concentrate mainly on investigations in murder cases, the «Shih-cheng lu»
lists  dozens  of  prescriptions  for  each  procedure –  inquests,  investigations,  arrests,
hearings,  and sending of  reports –  and illustrates  some of  them with examples from
actual  cases.  These  prescriptions  provide  us  with  important  information  about  the
practical functioning of the judicial system. Instructions to the magistrates on how to
avoid malpractice and abuse inevitably also point out the shortcomings of the Chinese
judicial  system.  The  authors  of  the  handbooks  had,  without  any  doubt,  personally
experienced such malpractice during their career in the civil administration.
12 During  the  Ming  dynasty  (1368-1644),  the  handbooks  were  essential  sources  of
information  on  law  and  judicial  procedures,  not  only  because  many  officials  were
insufficiently trained, but also because the Ming code, after its final revision in 138922,
was supposed to remain unchanged throughout the entire dynasty23,  so that,  as time
moved on, the code was no longer in accordance with social reality, and officials started
to experience problems in applying the existing code24. These problems were especially
critical in cases of civil nature, the so-called «minor matters of households, marriages,
and  land»  («hu,  hun,  t’ien-t’u hsi-shih»).  These  matters  were  not  always  sufficiently
recognized by the code, since they were supposed to be dealt with on the informal level.
Handbooks could give the officials practical instructions on how to deal with matters for
which the code could not offer a solution.
13 Lü K’un’s manual is less moralising and more pragmatic than many other handbooks. He
was motivated less by purely moral principles than by the awareness that well-educated
subordinates would ensure a correct and efficient functioning of the local government
Handbooks and local jurisdiction in Ming China. According to the sections on ...
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 6, n°2 | 2009
3
agencies.  Moral  considerations  are  comparatively  rare  in  his  «Shih-cheng  lu»25.
Occasionally, we find remarks such as:
14 «If the superior classes do not reform them by means of instruction, the lower classes will not have
any knowledge»26.
15 «The duties of the local authorities lie in redressing wrongs and in making injustices right»27.
16 These statements clearly reflect a Confucianist view of government and justice: officials
have to set an example for the population.
 
3. The sections on judicial matters in the «Shih-cheng
Lu», chapter «Feng-hsien Yüeh»
17 All quotations below – translated from the original classical  Chinese text – are drawn
from the chapter entitled «Feng-hsien yüeh», the exhortations for surveillance officials
(the censors in the capital,  the regional inspectors,  and the provincial administration
commissions), since they were the ones charged with revealing malpractice amongst the
other officials, and with taking corrective and punitive measures to redress or prevent it.
They  had  to  conduct  regular  and  irregular  evaluations  of  local  magistrates.  The
prescriptions and criticisms that Lü K’un directs at them give us, more than any other
chapter in his work, an idea of the shortcomings of the judicial system, especially on the
local level, and of the difficulties in applying the law at the end of the sixteenth century.
18 For each specific procedure that local officials had to deal with, the sections on «judicial
matters» («t’i-hsing shih-yi») in the chapter «Feng-hsien yüeh» give specific guidelines on
how to carry out that procedure and on how to avoid or solve problems that might arise
when carrying  it  out.  For  conducting  investigations  in  murder  cases,  the  guidelines
consist of 12 ‘articles’ in total; for investigating theft and robbery, Lü K’un’s advice is 11
articles long; the prescriptions for dealing with sexual offences consist of 4 articles; there
are 10 articles on arrests and imprisonment; 12 on hearing trials; and 4 on the use of
instruments of torture and punishment. This is followed by a series of models of official
forms, used for formulating complaints and accusations.
19 The  instructions  were  all  directed  towards  officials  responsible  for  supervising  the
functioning of local administrative levels. They stress primarily the initial stages in the
trying of a case, and not, or to a much lesser extent, such matters as higher appeals or the
granting of amnesties. The latter belonged to the activities of higher judicial organs on or
above the provincial level.
 
a. Instructions for correct investigations in cases of murder or
robbery
20 Lü  K’un  begins  the  chapter  «Feng-hsien  yüeh»  with  instructions  for  the  conducting  of
examinations in murder cases and in cases of theft and robbery. Although his instructions for the
conducting of forensic examinations are less elaborate than those given by Sung Tz’u in his «Hsi
yüan lu», it is obvious that Lü K’un used material from the «Hsi yüan lu», or from later works
modelled on the work of Sung Tz’u, to compose his guidelines for holding inquests. A few times, he
even refers to the «Hsi yüan lu».
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21 Lü K’un encourages officials to deal with all important aspects of the investigation themselves,
without delay – because delay makes it possible for evidence or witnesses to disappear, and enables
the parties involved to produce false evidence or to bribe witnesses – and without relying on sub-
official  functionaries28 or  lower officials  for  important  procedures –  because their  low salary 29
makes them eager to accept bribes, and because they often neglect their duty. The problem was
that the clerks and runners, who were recruited locally by the heads of prefecture, sub-prefecture
or district through a network of power and influence, escaped control by the central government,
and that they wielded a lot of real power in the local territorial units. Because they did most of the
practical work, they were much more familiar with legal matters and provisions than the officials
they worked for. In addition, their pay was fixed at a low rate, and they had no choice but to collect
supplementary payments in the form of fees, often paid by people involved in a lawsuit. Some also
collected money from the local residents by cheating when collecting land tax, or by extorting
money from suspects or their families when making investigation reports; others demanded fees for
delivering messages or for handing in tax payments to the local government30. Not surprisingly,
this made them unpopular with both the local population and their superiors. Traditionally, the
way they have been depicted in Chinese literature –  and in manuals for officials – is  far from
flattering.  Lü K’un is  very sceptical  towards «the sub-official  functionaries who have received
assignments [...] Do they have their minds set on fairness? Or on selfish motives?»31.
22 Lü  K’un  criticizes  the  habit  officials  had  of  passing  on  important  stages  in  the
investigation to their staff (clerks, runners, police officers), because they had no time to
go through these  procedures  themselves,  or  because they wanted to  avoid the most
unpleasant procedures – such as examining corpses.
23 «When an inquest is held, the officials who have received the assignment [for the inquest] are
disgusted by the uncleanness of the murder scene, [so that] none of them approaches the dead body
»32.
24 The author is strict and formal when it  comes to the responsibility of  the official  to
conduct an investigation, and his duty to do this within the prescribed period. He states
as a general rule, leaving room for only a few exceptions, that «in murder cases, on the day
when  a  notice  of  the  facts  and  a  court  order  for  investigation  reach  them,  [the  officials]
immediately [have to] leave their office duties behind, in order to go and conduct an examination.
If they can come to a conclusion on the spot, then they write out a notice and a report on that same
day. If the official who is charged with [the investigation] is really ill, or if it is absolutely necessary
that he attends to [other] matters, then, when the despatch reaches him, he has to decline [the
request to investigate] immediately, in order to make it possible to send somebody else. A section in
the ‘Hsi yüan lu’ determines that not more than two hours should elapse before one leaves to go
and investigate»33.
25 The second group of cases addressed by Lü K’un are robberies and thefts. He reminds his
fellow officials and subordinates of the frequency of fraudulentevidence in these cases.
The officials should spare no effort to recover the stolen goods, and to determine whether
goods were really stolen or not. Lü K’un does not hesitate to mention some spectacular
stories about how he or his fellow officials observed different forms of fraud.
26 «Recently, there was [a case in which the officials] suspected an innocent person of being a robber.
They searched his house, and found a yellow skirt.  They pointed it out as a stolen object. The
[person who pretended to be] the original owner of the stolen good claimed to recognize it [on the
basis of the fact that it was] wool from T’ai-yüan34.  The assistant-prefect brought a number of
skirts from the pawn-shop. Each had a different waist size. They laid them out in court, and the
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[person who claimed to be] the original owner of the stolen property did not know which one to
recognize [as being his].  He chose the wrong one, and [gave] inconsistent [answers]. When the
innocent  person  [who  had  been  accused  of  stealing  the  skirt]  arrived,  he  could  say,  without
hesitation: ‘This is my skirt’. [The one who claimed to be] the owner of the stolen good had nothing
to say. The innocent person was then released. From now on, when the authorities investigate
stolen goods, they cannot act without consideration»35.
27 Lü K’un estimates that false claims, such as the accusation in the story translated above,
add up to half of the accusations in cases of robbery and theft. Furthermore the clerks
and runners were sometimes involved in these plots. He proves this by means of another
savory story:
28 «There are people who have no choice but to ‘recognise’ the stolen goods, since the runners [who
cannot find the real thieves] force them to. Sir Lü36 of Ts’ang-nan37 told [me]: ‘When I made a tour
of inspection in Hai-yu38, there was [the case of] a widow who was robbed. Ten people were arrested
on a charge of robbery. The goods [in the possession of these suspects] that were [thought to be]
stolen were searched through [by the runners]. Amongst these goods, there was a pair of women’s
shoes. The runners passed by the widow’s house, and told her what the shoes [she had to report to
the  authorities  as  stolen]  looked  like.  Subsequently,  the  district  officials  examined the  ‘stolen
goods’. The widow then [pretended she] recognized each single one of them. When asked about the
shoes, she said: ‘They are my daughter’s shoes’. When [the district officials] asked her what size
they were, she told them what they looked like. When [her description was] compared with the
model [of the shoes] they had found in the house [of one of the ten suspects], there was not the
slightest difference. The ten had no words to explain this. When their punishment was only a few
days away, the real thieves were all arrested, and the real stolen goods were all discovered. As for
the ten [innocent] people, it could be clarified that the goods, previously thought to be stolen, were
their property»39.
29 By  citing  these  anecdotes,  Lü  K’un  tries  to  convince  officials  not  to  accept  claims
uncritically, since they were liable for punishment if they made a wrong judgment40. The
effect of this situation was, not surprisingly, that officials were often reluctant to accept
claims. Furthermore, investigating whether the plaint was true or not put such a heavy
burden on officials that they immediately refused to accept certain plaints. Additionally,
the officials in whose jurisdiction there was the lowest number of offences were regarded
as the best officials; hence, many officials tried to disguise the fact that criminal acts
occurred in their jurisdiction. If the facts could not be hidden, they had to solve the case
by the end of the imposed deadline and, as a consequence, produce an offender. This
often meant that officials or sub-official functionaries who could not find the culprit,
intimidated innocent people and forced them to plead guilty.
 
b. Instructions for dealing with sexual offences
30 Cases involving sexual offences could be extremely troublesome for the magistrates who had to
judge them, because «in cases of illicit sexual behaviour, there is normally no testimony. False
accusations are easily made, and it is difficult to clarify matters. […] From now on, each time an
accusation is entered in a case of illicit sexual intercourse, even if the woman in question confesses,
do not allow the plaint to be filed. How can you know for sure that it is not so that her husband is
forcing [her] to implicate somebody falsely, and how can you know that it is not so that the woman
in question is scheming for certain things [by accusing a man of having illicit sexual intercourse
with her]? […] From now on, each time a woman commits suicide because her consensual adultery
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has come to light and she feels ashamed about it, or when she commits suicide because she has
been beaten by her parents or her husband, and if the man who has pushed her to commit adultery
also  has  no  accusation  of  coercion  brought  against  him [by  the  relatives  of  the  woman who
committed suicide], it is hard to have the man who was involved in the illicit sexual activities
punished because he compelled her, through their adultery, to die»41.
31 It is obvious that in cases of rape and adultery as well, not all charges could be accepted42.
Because the penalty for illicit  sex with consent (beatings with a heavy bamboo staff)
differed  dramatically  from  the  punishment  for  rape  (death  by  strangulation),  the
responsibility  of  the  officials  who  investigated  and  sentenced  in  these  matters  was
extremely heavy, so that magistrates tended to shun this responsibility43.
32 Cases involving sexual offences were even harder to judge when they involved people
who  did  not  belong  to  the  «morally  educated»  classes.  The  difference  between  the
common people and the higher classes is, according to Lü K’un, that«men and women from
poor families easily have promiscuous relations. The moral integrity of these uneducated people is
very low. […] Therefore, the common people and poor masses cannot be blamed without giving the
matter consideration, by [judging them according to] the principles used for [judging] worthy men.
Each time facts of illicit sex by these people have to be dealt with, [officials] should not adhere
strictly to the letter of the law when there is the slightest sense of defiance of the law [by these
people]»44.
33 Officials are thus encouraged to use two standards in judging cases of adultery. The law needs to be
applied strictly when the matter involves people from higher social classes, but when similar events
occur among marginalized people,  where women often have no choice other than to submit to
coercion by men from their  environment,  the  accusations  should not  be  accepted that  easily.
Whereas the law makes no distinction between this form of coercive sexual intercourse, imposed by
social pressure amongst the lowest classes of society, and pure adultery, Lü K’un is fully aware of
the way social distinctions produce a great impact on sexual awareness and behaviour45.
 
c. Instructions for arresting and imprisoning suspects
34 The golden rule for arresting suspects is the same as for investigating stolen goods or
corpses: do not rely on sub-official functionaries, do it in person.
35 «When offenders have to be arrested, [the officials] delegate runners [to go and arrest the suspect].
The common practices of those hired sub-official functionaries really are the greatest misfortune
for the population. Recently, officials who want to break with malpractice and who care for the
people, often proceed to the arresting of the offender themselves»46.
36 These «common practices of the sub-official functionaries» refer to bribery and to the
arresting of innocent people in order to make them confess, abuses that could be avoided
only by keeping important procedures out of the hands of clerks and runners.
37 Arrests were sometimes followed by a long period of imprisonment. The code of the Ming
contains  regulations  that  are  meant  to  ensure  a  humane  treatment  of  prisoners.
Imprisonment was not a formally recognised sentence in itself; it was a measure taken to
detain people who were awaiting trial (sometimes including the plaintiff and witnesses)
or punishment. Nevertheless, many suspects spent many years in jail awaiting their trial
or  retrial,  or  their  punishment.  Contemporary descriptions47 show that  conditions in
Ming prisons were extremely harsh. Jailers, who also belonged to the group of sub-official
functionaries, frequently extorted money from prisoners and maltreated prisoners who
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refused to pay48. Lü K’un favours a correct treatment of prisoners, and he wishes to put an
end to the prevailing practices which meant that many did not survive imprisonment. He
even wants to avoid the imprisonment of people who have committed minor crimes, and
who have relatives who depend on them. He disapproves of «the conventional pattern of
arresting offenders and sending them to jail. [The local officials] do not know that, when a man sits
in prison, his whole family suffers. In some cases, they have elderly relatives and a household with
no wife [to take care of those elderly people], sometimes they have a young wife and no sons or
nephews [to protect her], in some cases the family is poor, and the way [to the prison] is long, so
they cannot supply [the prisoner with food]. Sometimes there are sick people in the family, or [the
prisoner]  himself  is  ill,  or,  in  the  winter  cold,  he  has  no  padded clothes.  In  some cases,  [the
prisoners] are destitute and hungry, and there is no money to put the prison in order. Even if a
person is sentenced to death, it is still necessary to take [his situation] to heart; furthermore, how
could it be appropriate to imprison them carelessly when they have committed minor deeds?»49.
38 If criminals must be imprisoned, Lü K’un holds the officials responsible for a humane
treatment of these offenders. Since it was impossible for the local authorities to ensure a
favourable treatment (especially free food) for all prisoners, the financially weakest ones
had to receive special consideration. The main problem was that «the financial means of the
authorities are truly not abundant. If the food for the prisoners would have to be totally provided
for [by the authorities], how could all people [in prison] equally receive these benefits, and this for
years on end? Now, I propose to make a distinction between three classes: except for the cases
where  [the  authorities]  are  not  allowed to  give  them [food]  when they have committed most
heinous crimes50, and except for the cases where [the authorities] are not allowed to give them
[food] if their family is not very poor, and they have somebody to provide them [with food], [the
authorities] give [the prisoners]a full ration when they have committed less severe deeds, and their
family is extremely poor or they have no family to provide them [with food], and [the authorities]
give them half their ration if they have committed less serious crimes, and their family is relatively
poor, and does not have enough for daily expenditures»51.
39 This section clearly reflects  the author’s  extremely realistic,  practical  and systematic
approach to such matters.It is obvious that the local government agencies did not have
unlimited financial  means.  The government budget that local  magistrates received to
finance the administrative expenses of their local offices was far from adequate; they had
to impose different kinds of customary fees in their jurisdiction. Furthermore these fees
were not always sufficient, since the population did not have the financial reserves to pay
high fees on top of the regular taxes. A local magistrate always had to find a way to raise
enough money to meet the expenses of his administration, without extracting too much
money from the people52.
 
d. Instructions for conducting trials
40 Here, the author repeatedly reminds the officials who conduct trials that they have to
respect the time limits for settling a case. Officials who do not respect the time limits are
to be punished53. Lü K’un does not seem willing to allow any exceptions on this point:
41 «From now on, if a case at law, no matter if it is difficult or easy to arrest and investigate, has not
been brought  to  a  conclusion after  three  months,  then,  because the  power and ability  of  the
responsible judicial official to manage affairs are not up to standard, he is put on the register for
evaluation [by his superiors]»54.
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42 «[The officials] have to hear a person immediately, on the same day that he gives himself up to the
authorities. Even if [the official] is extremely busy, it cannot be longer than two days [before he
hears him]55.
43 Besides warning the officials of the omnipresent time limits, Lü also encourages officials
not to stick to the letter of the law. Whereas the code and the imperial edicts were meant
to  be  «exhaustive»,  so  that  the  officials  would  not  have  to  weigh  their  decisions
themselves, but would merely have to look up the corresponding statute, sub-statute or
imperial  edict  and apply it,  Lü sees that,  in many cases,  these regulations cannot be
applied without consideration by the officials themselves. He is extremely critical of «
those [officials] who stick to the letter of the law, but who are not conversant with fundamental
principles; the [lacking] discernment and knowledge of these officials is obvious»56.
44 A third point the author wishes to raise in this section is that not all plaints are reliable,
and that litigation abuse is extremely common. This litigation abuse is seen as a crucial
problem by most of the handbook writers57. False plaints, in order to extort money from
the innocent accused, were often composed with the help from clerks working in local
government agencies, who augmented their low salaries by collecting fees from litigants58
,  or  with the help from the so-called «sung-shih»,  «litigation masters»,  people  (often
students  or  former  clerks)  who  were  specialised  in  drawing  up  charges,  or  false
accusations, for any client who could afford their services. They were familiar with the
loopholes of the legal and judicial system, and wasted the local magistrate’s time with
their constant sabotage in the form of plaints and counter-plaints59. If the magistrate did
not prove his competence in front of these abusers – and in front of the whole audience of
the open sessions in which the plaints were evaluated – by firmly refusing to accept their
plaints,  these  «litigation masters»  would  not  hesitate  to  exploit  this  weakness,  even
though they risked severe punishment60. One of the articles in the Ming code that was
meant to prevent false accusations from being presented stipulated that anyone entering
an anonymous accusation would receive the death penalty. Plaintiffs had to present their
accusations in person, not through a third party61.
45 In addition to the heavy responsibility of local officials (sentencing an innocent person, or
sentencing somebody for the wrong crime, would result in a penalty for the magistrate
himself),  this  litigation  abuse,  which  burdened  the  local  administrational  units  with
endless  useless  work,  was  one of  the main reasons why many plaints  should not  be
accepted. There are also moral reasons not to accept these plaints, because «among the
things that cause suffering for the people, none is worse than implicating others in a crime and
being fond of litigation. Unscrupulous people often implicate 20 or 30 people in one legal plaint,
[thereby] taking personal vengeance and benefiting themselves. In not even two or three out of ten
of these cases, [these abusers] have crucial evidence of the offence. How should one believe and
trust  these  cunning  rogues?  Each  time  they  receive  a  plaint,  the  officials  in  charge  have  to
comment on it immediately in a public court session62. If [the plaint] is irrelevant, then they must
reject it»63.
46 This  brings  us  again  to  the  conclusion  that  magistrates  should  not  accept  plaints
indiscriminatingly,  especially not those about minor matters,  in order to prevent the
caseload of local administrational units from becoming overwhelming. If the number of
penal matters in a local magistrate’s jurisdiction was too high, he risked being found
incompetent in his superiors’ evaluations, since, according to the traditional Confucianist
view on government and law, the task of a good government functionary was, in the first
place, to prevent injustice from happening, rather than restoring what had gone wrong.
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Every three years, an official was evaluated by his immediate superiors. Their report was
then handed over to the provincial authorities, who sent it to the central government. As
a result of the evaluations, officials could be demoted, dismissed, promoted, or asked to
retire. Besides these regular evaluations, the authorities also subjected magistrates to
irregular evaluations64.
 
e. Instructions for using «instruments of torture»65
47 In this section, Lü instructs the officials on how and when to use the six authorised «instruments of
torture» (the light bamboo staff, the heavy bamboo staff, the heavy stick, the wooden collarpiece,
the  handcuffs,  and  the  fetters)66.  The  collarpiece  and  the  fetters  were  used  as  additional
punishments, whereas «the light and heavy bamboo and the heavy stick can only be used in cases
involving serious offences, when [the offender] does not confess»67.
48 Although Lü K’un favours a humane treatment of suspects and prisoners, he nevertheless
allows the use of some «extra-legal» torture instruments, but only within certain limits.
Here, two of Lü K’un’s most important ideals seem to be in conflict: his concern for a
humane treatment of suspects and convicts on one hand, and his fanatical belief in an
efficient legal system, which included speeding up the judicial procedures, and especially
the obtaining of confessions, on the other. In an attempt to find a compromise between
these two principles, he limits the use of illegal torture as follows:
49 «Recently, among the officials who try cases, there are some who do not have refined feelings, and
who do not have a patient character. For cases of theft, without making any distinction between
robbery and burglary, and for murder cases, without making any distinction between true and
false  [accusations],  as  soon  as  [the  accused]  enters  their  office,  [these  officials]  only  rely  on
squeezing instruments.  I  cannot give a full  description of these atrocities.  From now on, if  the
evidence proves [the guilt of the accused], and the facts are indeed revealed, [but the offender] is
not willing to confess, torture instruments like these can be used, [but] the squeezing cannot be
done more than once. Pressing the fingers can only be done on two fingers, and the squeezing
cannot last longer than two hours. Hoops [that are tightened around] the head cannot be used at
all»68.
50 Illegal torture69 was common practice, since a confession was deemed to be the only way
to  settle  a  case  satisfactorily.  Although  officials  could  be  punished  if  they  tortured
somebody (the suspects, but also the witnesses) illegally, the frequent complaints about
these practices prove that the pressure of having to find a culprit who confessed weighed
heavier  for  the  magistrates  than  their  fear  of  being  punished  for  maltreatment  of
suspects.
 
f. Models of the forms for reporting crimes
51 To report criminal facts to the authorities, a form needed to be filled out. The author
gives in his handbook models of 27 different forms. Where blanks must be filled in, Lü
offers the possibility of multiple choice, or he explains what kind of information needs to
be given there. The uniformity of these forms would rule out misunderstandings, and
serve his ideal of a smoothly working civil and judicial bureaucracy. If somebody wanted
to enter an accusation, but did not use the required formulation, the plaint could not be
accepted. In his handbook, Lü K’un explains the necessity of these standard forms. He
determines that «what is now fixed as a model needs to be observed uniformly by all bureaus. If
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[a plaint] is not [composed] according to the fixed pattern,[but it is nevertheless accepted,] then it
is easy to know which officials accept too much. Each time any of the prefectures, sub-prefectures
or districts70 receives a legal plaint, the office [of that locality] is responsible for ordering its clerks
to compose the documents. If, afterwards, [the form] is not filled in according to the model, then the
clerks are liable for a serious punishment, and the accusation cannot be accepted»71.
52 Besides using the right form, the party that wanted to enter an accusation had to observe
a number of other standard regulations:
53 «People are not allowed to bring a case before the officials in more than one place. They are also not
allowed to add even one detail falsely [to the facts]. If [these regulations] are disregarded, it is
examined and re-investigated. [Even] if [the plaintiff] has a long way to go [to reach the office
where he can enter an accusation], it can [still] not be more than five days before he brings his
plaint»72.
54 Below, we have translated two of the models presented by Lü K’un. We have chosen forms
that are used for matters of civil nature: a form for reporting financial debts, and a form
for reporting disputes over so-called «household divisions».
55  «Model of a form for reporting financial debts:
56 ‘In district (x), belonging to sub-prefecture (x) in prefecture (x), person (x) has incurred debts.
Because person (x) was short of capital, somebody lent (x ounces of silver or x piculs of grain) to
person (x) on the (x)th day of the (x)th month of the year (x), and he added an interest of three
percent a month 73. He designated somebody to be the mediator, and [he made] a receipt for the
borrowed money. Now, person (x)has, during several years, up to this day, not returned the least
bit of the interest, or he has only returned (a certain amount) of the interest, and he still owes (a
certain amount).Repeatedly, he has asked for a delay of payment, [but] no agreement was reached,
[so now] it is reported to the authorities’74.
57 Disputes over debts were usually resolved through a middleman, so that lawsuits over
unpaid debts were not very numerous. The lender could turn to this mediator for help if
the borrower did not repay; if this mediator also acted as a guarantor, he was supposed to
pay in the case of non-payment by the borrower. For large amounts, the lender usually
required pledged security75.
58 «Model of a form for reporting [arguments over] property:
59 ‘Person (x) from district (x),  belonging to sub-prefecture (x) in prefecture (x),  is involved in a
dispute concerning property. For a certain reason 76,  a certain (ancestor x) left [to his sons or
grandsons], (a number of houses, or x acres of land, or a capital consisting of x ounces of silver, or a
number of women’s ornaments or garments). Person (x)had to share it equally with certain (uncles
or elder brothers), according to the family relationships. Now, person (x), taking advantage of the
fact that he is a senior [relative], completely intimidates [the other relatives] and takes it all, and
does not share it. Referring to the will, or to the testimony of a certain (relative or neighbour), it is
reported’»77.
60 The procedure for  this  kind of  household division (with an equal  partition –  usually
between brothers – of land, houses, or furniture) was complex and easily led to conflicts.
These divisions of family property involved mediators,  who witnessed the division in
order to avoid possible disputes in the future, so that lawsuits over household division
were comparatively rare78.
61 Some of the forms (such as these for reporting unpaid debts or property disputes, and
forms for reporting marital disputes) clearly dealt with matters of civil nature (the above-
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mentioned  «minor  cases  of  households,  marriages  and  land»).  The  law  expected
magistrates  to  deal  with  penal  matters,  whereas  civil  matters  (unless  they  involved
criminal acts) had to be dealt with by informal justice, with middlemen (in conflicts over
contractual  matters)  or  community  leaders  acting  as  mediators  trying  to  find  a
compromise. In most cases, the parties involved in a conflict turned to the official judicial
organs only if no agreement could be reached through this informal justice system. If
somebody did take his civil case to the local magistrates to reach a settlement, he had to
convince the – often reluctant – magistrate to accept his plaint or petition. The primary
condition for this was to use the standardized form to present the plaint.
 
Conclusion
62 Why, could one ask, does Lü K’un still warn officials against the corrupt behaviour of
clerks and runners, against fraud by culprits and victims, and against their own short-
sightedness, 350 years after Sung Tz’u had done the same, and even longer after Kuei
Wan-jung had published his case book? Should the task of civil administrators not have
become easier, since their number had increased79? Why did Lü K’un feel the need to
write this new manual for magistrates?
63 It is impossible to state that the previous handbooks had become obsolete; many later
versions of the handbooks from earlier dynasties were published during the Ming and
Ch’ing dynasties80. Those later versions incorporated new elements, so that they kept in
tune with recent developments.
64 To understand why Lü K’un compiled this new work, we need to be aware of the fact that
he was an idealist, who was convinced that he had to do all that was in his power to
promote social  harmony and justice.  When assuming his  provincial  posts,  he wanted
optimal co-operation from his subordinates, and he required that they be totally familiar
with judicial procedures, in order to serve the public interest. Therefore, he wrote out
these instructions. He carried his fanatical belief in order and perfection so far that he
even started criticizing the emperor for his shortcomings, in his famous memorial of
1597. As a result, Lü was accused of dereliction of duty and dismissed81.
65 Another important factor is the fact that, although the number of officials had risen, their
expertise  and  experience  in  many  fields,  including  the  legal  field,  often  proved
insufficient.  Officials  easily shifted from one function to another during their career,
without having the chance to specialize in any one field. Furthermore, in most cases, the
civil-service examinations did not test the candidates’ legal and judicial knowledge82. The
magistrates had to rely on the specialized knowledge of sub-official functionaries, such as
clerks and technical  aids,  whose total  number probably exceeded 100,000 during the
Ming. Lü K’un felt the need to give the officials under his authority specific advice in
order to improve their expertise, including in «minor cases of households, marriages and
land», which were still too often overlooked by the central government and for which the
stipulations in the official code proved insufficient.
66 Besides the lack of expertise, there were other important problems that threatened the
smooth functioning of local government agencies, such as the heavy responsibilities of
local magistrates in penal matters, the numerous abuses, and the overwork and financial
limitations of the local administrative units. The heavy responsibilities consisted of the
magistrate’s liability for punishment if he made a wrong judgment, and of the fact that he
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had  to  keep  the  number  of  legal  cases  in  his  jurisdiction  low  enough  to  receive  a
favourable evaluation from his superiors; at the same time, he had to conclude the cases
he dealt with in a satisfactory manner by finding an offender who would confess. This had
to happen within the prescribed time limit, otherwise it could lead to his punishment and
impeachment. Abuses, by their own staff (corruption, extortion, abuse of power) or by
outsiders (drawing up and entering of false accusations), put a heavy burden on the local
magistrates. Even the heavy penalties they risked did not deter abusers. Furthermore, as
their caseload increased, local officials saw a great deal of their time consumed by often
useless investigations – and they could not afford to waste any time, since there were
always deadlines to be taken into account. In addition, some local government bureaus
did not have the financial means to guarantee correct functioning and fair treatment of
victims and suspects.
67 A major source of conflicts of interests, which formed the basis of many problems in local
units of judicial administration, were the different motivations of officials and sub-official
functionaries. The former wanted to keep the number of cases in their jurisdiction as low
as possible, out of fear of a negative evaluation and because they simply did not have the
time to deal with a great number of cases, whereas the latter wished to help anybody,
reliable or not, to enter accusations, since their income directly depended on the number
of cases for which they helped to draw up documents or for which one of the parties
bribed them.
68 An important question that remains unanswered is: do Lü K’un’s guidelines make the task
of officials easier in the end and do they help them save time and avoid abuses? One of
the most frequently recurring pieces of advice to the local magistrates in the «Shih-cheng
lu» is that they should not accept plaints lightly. Refusing obviously ungrounded plaints
was the best way to avoid some of the most frequent abuses, and to save time and money.
This  way,  if  the  number  of  cases  could  be  reduced by  refusing  to  accept  unreliable
accusations,  officials  would  have  enough  time  to  deal  with  important  procedures
themselves, so that runners and clerks would not be given the opportunity to abuse their
authority.  However,  it  seems  to  us  that  even  if  officials  refused  to  accept  all
«unreasonable» accusations,  dealing with all  important judicial  procedures personally
would  probably  consume  as  much  time  as  they  wasted  on  dealing  with  false  and
ungrounded charges.
69 A second basic  guideline that  features prominently in Lü K’un’s  manual  is  that  local
officials should not confine themselves to the letter of the law. They should also use their
own  common  sense  and  experience  in  investigating  and  judging,  for  instance  when
judging  cases  of  «illicit  sex»  among  the  lower  classes  of  the  population.  This
«consideration» he expects from local officials consumes more time and energy than a
simple, «blind» application of the law would do.
70 As these examples show, there are often conflicts between Lü K’un’s ideals and principles,
especially between the ideal of ensuring a humane treatment of suspects and convicts,
and the ideal of efficiency and saving time (which would allow the official to handle more
matters personally, and to prevent abuses). These ideals are often difficult to unite for Lü
K’un, who is constantly trying to find a compromise and a reasonable balance between
them.
71 One of the most striking manifestations of this conflict between principles can be found
in Lü K’un’s advice on illegal torture: inspired by his ideal of humaneness, he does not
approve of it, and he even wants to convince officials to avoid, as much as possible, any
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form  of  torture,  whereas,  pushed  by  his  ideal  of  efficiency  and  saving  time,  he
acknowledges that some forms of – legal and illegal – torture can be used, under certain
restrictions, when a suspect who is clearly guilty refuses to confess.
72 His whole handbook is full of attempts to find such compromises. Lü K’un had a sharp and
accurate view on some of the most acute judicial problems in his time. His solutions were
realistic, but they often consisted of compromises that were probably not always easy to
maintain in reality. The fact that his handbook remained important during the Ch’ing
dynasty  (1644-1911)  proves,  however,  that  officials  who  had  real  experience  of  the
problems addressed by Lü K’un accepted his solutions as realistic.
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NOTES
2. A general introduction to the governmental system during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) can
be found in Hucker (1961). This work provides a clear analysis of the structure of the imperial
government  during  the  Ming.  It  contains  primarily information  on  the  central  government
agencies. A more detailed study of Ming government, and especially of government personnel
during the Ming, at both central and local levels, can be found in Hucker (1998; 1966). The latter
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is a collection of studies by different scholars on detailed aspects of Ming government, such as
the  statistical  material  on  Ming  local  administration  presented  by  L.  Yang.  Hucker  (1966)
analyses in detail the organizational structure of the censorial system, the system of surveillance
over  all  governmental  organs  and  actions,  during  the  Ming.  Two  works  that  deal  with  the
situation  of  local  government  agencies  are  Mc  Knight  (1971)  and  Ch’ü  (1962).  Both  raise
interesting points on the appointment, promotion and demotion of officials, on the selection and
recruitment of personnel by local officials, and on the disciplinary control over their staff. Mc
Knight (1971) analyses the local situation during the Southern Sung (1127-1279), whereas Ch’ü
(1962) gives detailed information on the functions of, and the relations between, all the different
groups  of  local  government  personnel  (officials,  their  clerks,  personal  servants,  private
secretaries, etc.) during the Ch’ing dynasty (1644-1911). A basic introduction to penal law during
the Ming can be found in Münzel (1968). This work offers a translation of one of the monographs
on Ming law included in the «Ming-shih», the official dynastic history of the Ming.
3. On the use of magistrate handbooks, especially in the context of civil law, see Huang (1996). In
the chapter 8 of his work («From the perspective of magistrate handbooks»), he analyses the
advice of compilers of handbooks during the Ch’ing (1644-1911) on both formal adjudication and
informal mediation in civil matters. Langlois (1998) contains a short analysis (pp. 205-206) of one
Ming handbook, the «Fa-chia tsung lun» («General teachings for the jurist»), and an appendix by
T. Nimick, who lists more than 20 titles of Ming handbooks for local magistrates, with short notes
on their authors and contents.
4. Translated by Van Gulik (1956).
5. Bodde, Morris (1967, p.145).
6. Translated by Giles (1924) and Mc Knight (1981).
7. Mc Knight (1981, p. 31).
8. See Ch’en (1979, p. 91).
9. Langlois (1998, p. 207).
10. Part II (pp. 103-213) of Handlin (1983) is entirely dedicated to Lü K’un. In this section, Handlin
analyses a number of Lü K’un’s works, such as his writings for women and children, his work on
city defence, and his medical works.
11. The  system  of  recruitment  through  examinations  was  the  most  important  system  for
recruiting civil  officials  during the Ming.  The first  phase of  these examinations,  which were
conducted every three years, were the provincial examinations, in each provincial capital, in Pei-
ching,  and  in  Nan-ching.  Those  who  passed  these  provincial  examinations  could  sit  the
metropolitan examination in the capital. This was followed by a palace examination, where those
who  had  passed  the  metropolitan  examination  were  divided  by  rank  into  three  groups.
Metropolitan graduates could begin a career in the civil administration. See Hucker (1985, p. 81).
12. That Lü K’un is traditionally regarded as a person of exceptional integrity also appears from
the notes on his life in the «Chung-kuo jen-ming ta tz’u-tien» («A Chinese biographical dictionary»):
«He paid attention to moral education; his actions were just and wise». See Tsang (1921, p. 338).
13. The ministry of personnel (li-pu) was responsible for appointments, demotions, promotions
and evaluations of officials and sub-official functionaries. It was subdivided into four bureaus:
the  ‘bureau  of  appointments’,  the  ‘bureau  of  honours’,  the  ‘bureau  of  merit  titles’,  and  the
‘bureau of evaluations’. See Hucker (1985, p. 306).
14. Administration  vice-commissioners  ( ts’an-cheng)  worked  in  the  provincial  administration
commissions,  agencies  at  the  provincial  level  that  conducted  the  general  administrational
matters of local units of territorial administration (prefectures, sub-prefectures and districts).
Normally the vice-commissioners were detached from the headquarters of the commission to
serve in a branch office with a specific function or in a specific region. See Hucker (1985, p. 517).
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15. Surveillance commissioners (an-ch’a shih), of which one was appointed in each province, were
charged with overseeing judicial matters and with surveillance activities. See Hucker (1985, p.
103).
16. The  administration  commissioners  (pu-cheng  shih),  of  which two were  appointed in  each
province,  were the heads of  the above-mentioned provincial  administration commission.  See
Hucker (1985, p.127).
17. Parsons (1969, pp. 181-184) has tried to calculate the relative political power of the Chinese
provinces during the Ming, based on the number of official posts in each individual province out
of the total number of official positions, and on the ratio between official positions and total
population in each province. The author concludes that the provinces of Shan-tung, Shan-hsi and
Shen-hsi,  where  Lü  K’un  held  important  provincial  positions,  were  moderately  powerful
provinces.
18. Franke (1968, p. 183).
19. Lit.  «guardians  of  the  customs  and  laws»,  an  unofficial  reference  to  members  of  the
censorate,  a  central  government agency responsible for maintaining disciplinary surveillance
over  the  officials  and  for  checking  judicial  records,  and  of  agencies  such  as  the  provincial
surveillance commissions. Used as a general reference to officials responsible for inspecting and
supervising the (local) magistrates. Hucker (1985, p. 213).
20. For a biography of Lü K’un, see Goodrich, Fang (1976, pp. 1006-1008).
21. Huang (1996, pp. 198-202).
22. The  first  codified  laws  of  the  Ming  (« Lü-ling»,  «Codified  laws  and  commands»)  were
promulgated in 1368; in 1374, a drastically revised version of the code was promulgated; further
revisions were made in 1376 and 1383, and finally in 1389. This final version was entitled «Ta
Ming lü» («Great Ming code»). See Langlois (1998, pp. 172-173).
23. See Langlois (1993, pp. 87-90). The founder of the Ming, Chu Yüan-chang (emperor T’ai-tsu,
1368-1399), ordered that the code should remain unchanged. Flexibility, so as to keep in touch
with changes in society, was brought into the system by means of ad hoc sub-statutes added to
the fixed statutes in the code.
24. On the problem of how to apply the Ming code in changing Ming society, see Jiang (2000).
Jiang studies  the casebook of  a  local  official  in  the district  of  Hsün (in  what  is  now Ho-nan
Province), to find how he tried to enforce the dynastic law code in a local, drastically changing
context.
25. For the moral and practical nature of handbooks, see Huang (1996, pp. 198-222).
26. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 194).
27. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 189).
28. These  ‘sub-official  functionaries’  did  not  belong  to  the  formally  recognized  group  of
magistrates. They belonged to the staff of officials on the prefectural, sub-prefectural and district
levels. They were chosen from among the population by the office heads themselves, to become
clerks  or  runners.  The  runners  served  the  local  magistrate  as  guards,  policemen,  lictors  or
messengers. See Hucker (1985, p. 392).
29. During  the  Ming,  official  salaries  were  rather  low  in  comparison  to  other  dynasties.
Nominally,  they  might  have  been  the  same,  but  they  were  only  partially  paid  in  rice,  the
remainder was paid in the form of paper money, silk, cotton, or silver, at low conversion rates.
See Hucker (1985, p.82, and 1998, pp. 51-52).
30. For the various forms of corruption committed by local runners,  see also Ch’ü (1962, pp.
67-70).
31. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 188).
32. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 187).
33. Ibid.
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35. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 193).
36. It is not very clear who this «sir Lü» in the text is; most probably, he was an investigating
censor. Investigating censors normally worked in the central government agencies to check the
records, but they could also be dispatched to inspect local units of territorial administration. See
Hucker (1985, pp.145-146).
37. Ts’ang-nan is a coastal district in the present-day province of Che-chiang, near the border
with Fu-chien. See Hsia (1989, p. 637).
38. Hai-yu was, originally, the name that referred to the region close to the Yellow Sea and the
East China Sea; in the Ming, it became the name of a so-called ‘circuit’ (tao). These ‘circuits’ were
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censorate  (the  central  government  agency  in  charge  of  disciplinary  surveillance  over  the
government officials, and of checking judicial records). The ‘circuit’ of Hai-yu corresponded to
the province of Shan-tung. See Hsia (1989, p. 1058), and Hucker (1985, pp. 487-488).
39. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, pp. 192-193).
40. There were two kinds of «offences committed by officials»: «official offences» and «private
offences». The «official offences» were committed in the official capacity of the magistrate, but
not out of personal motives and without premeditation. «Private offences» were committed in
the official or private capacity, out of personal motives. Both were punishable, the latter more
severely than the former.  Officials were however privileged to have punishments (except for
death  penalties)  commuted  to  fines,  reduction  or  deprivation  of  official  rank.  Only  if  they
committed such an offence for the third time did they lose the right to redeem their punishment.
See Münzel (1968, pp. 58-60).
41. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 194).
42. For the legislation and penal measures against sexual offenders during the Ming and Ch’ing
Dynasties, see Sommer (2000, pp. 66-165; 325-327).
43. See Sommer (2000, p. 88).
44. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 195).
45. Sommer (2000, pp. 91-93) refers in this context to an interesting Ch’ing case of 1739, in which
a  woman and her  daughter,  belonging  to  a  gang of  itinerant  beggars,  were  raped and then
punished  for  illicit  sexual  intercourse.  The  author  concludes  that  «the  judiciary’s  stereotyped
dichotomies (coercion/consent, chaste/unchaste) seem inadequate to capture the reality of sex as survival
strategy at the bottom of Ch’ing society».
46. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 198).
47. Interesting sources on prison life during the Ming are the «Ch’u-k’un chi» («Notes on suffering
in prison») and the «Hsü ch’u-k’un chi» («Further notes on suffering in prison») by Yang Chüeh
(1493-1549), an official who was imprisoned twice for a total period of seven years. On his life and
suffering in prison, he wrote these two essays after his release. See Goodrich, Fang (1976, pp.
1506-1508). Also Tso Kuang-tou (1575-1625), an official who was involved in conflicts with other
high officials, was incarcerated upon imperial order. From prison, he wrote a number of notes to
his  sons,  describing  the  daily  suffering  and  torture  he  endured.  He  did  not  survive  his
imprisonment. See Goodrich, Fang (1976, pp. 1306-1307).  A similar contribution was made by
Fang Pao (1668-1749, alternative name Fang Wang-hsi) in the Ch’ing dynasty; Fang, a scholar and
prose  writer, was  imprisoned  together  with  his  whole  family  during  a  literary  inquisition
regarding a work to which Fang was said to have contributed. About his incarceration, he wrote
the  «Yü-chung  chi»  («Notes  from  prison»),  later  edited  in  the  «Fang  Wang-hsi  ch’üan-chi»
(«Collected works of Fang Wang-hsi»). See Hummel (1943, pp. 235-237). Fang Pao’s «Yü-chung chi»
have been translated by D.F. Pollard under the title «Life in Prison». See Pollard (1990).
48. See Ch’ü (1962, pp. 81-82).
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49. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 196).
50. Lit.: «those of whom the crime is serious, the evil is heinous, and of whom even death would
not expiate all the crimes».
51. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, pp. 195-196).
52. On the financial situation of local government agencies and magistrates, see Ch’ü (1962, pp.
22-32).
53. The time limits could be extended, but in many cases this also involved a forfeiture of the
magistrate’s salary for a certain period of time. See Ch’ü (1962, p. 122).
54. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 198).
55. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 199).
56. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 200).
57. The authors of some handbooks even saw a difference between the North and the South of
China: the northerners were simple, whereas the southerners were crafty and entered more false
accusations. See Huang (1996, p. 214).
58. This undoubtedly led to a conflict  of  interests:  whereas the magistrates (because of time
pressure and in order to secure a favourable evaluation) tried to keep the number of cases low,
their clerks (in order to secure their income by collecting fees) frequently tried to convince and
help people to enter accusations.
59. Bodde, Morris (1967, p. 189).
60. The penalty for entering a totally false accusation consisted of the punishment for the crime
of which the plaintiff falsely accused somebody, increased by two or three degrees. For partially
false accusations, the penalties were less severe: when wrongly accusing an accomplice of being
the principal offender, the plaintiff was not punished; when accusing somebody of a more serious
crime than the one he had actually committed, the plaintiff would get a punishment that was as
severe as the difference between the punishment for the crime committed and the punishment
for the crime that he falsely accused the defendant of. See Münzel (1968, p. 125).
61. Langlois (1998, p. 190).
62. Most authors of Ch’ing handbooks also favoured open sessions, since these sessions had large
audiences, which meant that the comments of the magistrate would be published abroad as a
warning to potential abusers. See Huang (1996, p. 212). During these sessions, the plaintiff and
the accused could be confronted with each other. See Münzel (1968, p. 18).
63. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, pp. 197-198).
64. On the evaluations of officials by their superiors, see Ch’ü (1962, pp. 33-35) and Hucker (1985,
p. 85).
65. According to the Ming code, the only authorized means of torture was flogging; this could be
done only when evidence or testimony clearly proved that the accused was guilty, but he refused
to confess. According to the code of the T’ang (618-907), a suspect could, during the hearings, be
flogged only as many times as the code had provided as a punishment for the crime he was
accused of (which varied between 10 and 50 strokes with the light bamboo, and between 60 and
100 strokes with the heavy bamboo), but this protective regulation no longer existed in Ming
legislation. See Münzel (1968, p. 18). Besides flogging, the Ming code accepted only the wooden
collarpiece (a large wooden block that was put on the shoulders of the convict, around his neck,
so that he could not reach his head with his hands) as an additional punishment, but other forms
of  additional  punishment  or  torture,  such  as  fetters,  handcuffs  and  finger  presses,  were
commonly used and accepted in practice;  even according to the pronouncements of the first
Ming  emperor,  that  were  issued  to  supplement  the  permanent  code,  these  «extra-legal
punishments» were acceptable. See Huai (1998, pp. 459-466), and Langlois (1993, p. 88).
66. For these authorized instruments  of  punishment and torture,  see also Münzel  (1968,  pp.
38-41).
67. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 200).
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68. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 201).
69. Illegal torture included the use of extra-legal forms of torture, and applying torture to people
who could not be tortured (such as torturing innocent people out of personal enmity).
70. These were the three basic units of territorial administration. By the end of the Ming, the
empire was divided into 159 prefectures,  234 sub-prefectures,  and 1,144 districts.  See Hucker
(1985, pp. 77-78).
71. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 202).
72. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 202, note under the article on «reporting murder cases»).
73. According to the Ming code, interest rates could not exceed three percent a month, and the
total  interest could not exceed the original  amount.  This legally fixed interest rate was only
respected until the middle of the fifteenth century; from then on, the average interest rate was
close to 100 percent a year, and, in particular cases, the yearly interest could even reach 600
percent. See T’ung (1998, pp. 248-249).
74. Lü K’un ([1598]1992, p. 205).
75. See Huang (1996, pp. 34-36).
76. Household  divisions  did  not  necessarily  occur  after  the  parents  or  grandparents  were
deceased; quite often, brothers divided up the family property during their parents’ lifetime.
77. Lü K’un ([1598] 1992, p. 205).
78. See Huang (1996, pp. 26-27).
79. The Southern Sung (1127-1279, the period in which Sung Tz’u and Kuei Wan-jung lived) is
thought to have had about 12,000 officials, of which 8,000 worked in the central government
offices, and only 4,000 in local territorial units. See Mc Knight (1971, p. 8). In the beginning of the
Ming, there were only 8,000 official  posts;  by the second half  of  the sixteenth century,  their
number had risen to 20,000. See Huang (1985, p. 219). Heijdra (1998, p. 561) believes that there
were between 25,000 and 40,000 officials during the Ming.
80. Such as the «Wu yüan lu», the «P’ing yüan lu» and the different works bearing the title «Hsi
yüan chi-lu», all based on the original «Hsi yüan lu». See Mc Knight (1981, p. 31).
81. See Goodrich, Fang (1976, pp. 1007-1008).
82. Elman (2000, p. 719) gives the example of the prefecture of Ying-t’ien, where, among the
policy  questions  asked  on  the  civil  examinations  between  1474  and  1600, only  15  %  were
questions about law.
ABSTRACTS
In addition to their judicial functions, local magistrates in imperial China had to perform many
other tasks, without specializing in any one field. In order to ensure that these officials would
have the necessary expertise, handbooks were compiled.
The  «Shih-cheng  lu»  («Record  of  practical  government»),  a  manual  edited  in  1589,  contains
sections  that  offer  an  extremely  realistic  insight  into  the  functioning,  difficulties  and
shortcomings  of  local  judicial  administration  during  the  Ming  dynasty  (1368-1644).  These
sections – guidelines for surveillance officials – point out the many problems that surrounded
local magistrates in Ming China: the constant threat of unfavorable evaluations, the continuous
pressure of investigation deadlines,  a large caseload,  underpaid staff  who did not hesitate to
abuse their authority, and liability for punishment if they made wrong judgments. Lü K’un, the
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author of the manual, does not address these problems without advising magistrates on how to
avoid them. By translating sections from the original  classical  Chinese text,  and by situating
them in the social and legal context of the Ming dynasty, we discover the motives and the –
sometimes conflicting – ideals of the author of this important work in the legal history of China.
Les magistrats locaux de la Chine impériale n’étaient pas spécialisés dans un domaine particulier
et  devaient  accomplir  de  nombreuses  tâches,  à  part  de  leurs  fonctions  judiciaires.  Certaines
sections du «Shih-cheng lu» («L’archive de la pratique du gouvernement»), un manuel édité en
1589, nous fournissent un aperçu extrêmement réaliste du fonctionnement, des difficultés et des
lacunes de l’administration judiciaire locale sous la dynastie Ming (1368-1644). Ces sections – des
directives pour les fonctionnaires chargés de la surveillance – signalent les nombreux problèmes
qui guettaient les magistrats locaux de la Chine des Ming: la menace constante d’évaluations
négatives; la pression permanente pour respecter les délais imposés pour les enquêtes; la charge
de travail importante; le personnel mal rétribué qui n’hésitait pas à abuser de son autorité; et
enfin leur responsabilité personnelle en cas de jugement erroné. Lü K’un, l’auteur de ce manuel,
aborde (néanmoins) ces difficultés en indiquant comment les prévenir. En traduisant certains
passages de ce texte chinois classique et les situant dans le contexte social et légal de la dynastie
Ming, nous découvrons les mobiles et les idéaux – parfois contradictoires – de l’auteur de cette
importante œuvre de l’histoire juridique chinoise.
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